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 The immediate inspiration for this paper are the open letter to Mankiw on November 2, 2012 by the 
‘Concerned Students of Economics 10’ (Harvard Political Review, downloaded at: 
http://hpronline.org/harvard/an-open-letter-to-greg-mankiw/ on 18 January, 2012) and the thoughtful 
reflection on it, in the context of macroeconomic curricula at selected Indian Universities by Visakh Varma in 
his recent article in EPW (Varma, 2012).  For the convenience of the interested reader, the ‘open letter to 








, or rather that part of it which from time to 
time claims a monopoly of defining the subject, has always been 
victim of history. For lengthy periods, when the world economy 
appears to be rolling on quite happily with or without advice, 
history  encourages  a  good  deal  of  self-satisfaction.  Proper 
economics has the floor, improper economics is tacitly excluded, 
or  consigned  to  the  twilight  world  of  past  and  present 
heterodoxy,  the  equivalent  of  faith-healing  or  acupuncture  in 
medicine.  ……  However,  from  time  to  time  history  catches 
economists  at  their  brilliant  gymnastics  and  walks  off  with 
their overcoats. The early 1930s were such a period, and we are 
living  through  another  such.  At  least  some  economists  are 
dissatisfied with the state of their subject.” 
 
Eric Hobsbawm: Marshall Lecture I, Faculty of Economics & Politics, Cambridge University, 1980, 
Reprinted in Hobsbawm (1997, Chapter 7, p. 95; italics added) 
 
                                                           
 Obviously Hobsbawm is referring, here, to Macroeconomics.  
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§ 1. A Personal and Professional Preamble 
“So I got up and asked: 
Is  it  your  view  that  if  I  went  out  and  bought  a  new  overcoat,  that  would  increase 
unemployment? 
‘Yes’, said Hayek. ‘But’, pointing to his triangles on the board, ‘it would take a very long mathematical 
argument to explain why.’ ”
1 
Richard Kahn (1984), p. 180; italics added. 
 
Half a century separated the Marshall Lectures given by Eric Hobsbawm in 1980 and Hayek’s talk to 
the Marshall Society in 1931. Ostensibly, the only common element in their two fascinating lectures, 
each – of course – vastly so in widely differing ways, were overcoats!  
 
I began studying – and almost immediately also teaching – macroeconomics exactly forty years ago, 
the very year that could be said to have initiated the  Lucasian, or Newclassical, Macroeconomic 
‘Revolution’. Expectations and the Neutrality of Money (Lucas, 1972), the Lucasian fountainhead of 
what  is  sometimes  referred  to  as  the  Rational  Expectations  Revolution  in  Macroeconomics, 
‘witheringly rejected’ by the Journal to which it was first submitted (Lucas, 1981, p. 10), was also 
published forty years ago. In this sense, I have lived all my ‘macroeconomic life’ in the dark shadows 
cast by the rise – and rise – of Newclassical economics
2, spending my time in trying to ‘catch them in 
their brilliant gymnastics’ and to walk ‘with their [mathematical] overcoats’.  
 
Mercifully, the macroeconomics I was taught, and I hope I learned, at the University of Lund, in 
Sweden and Cambridge University, in the 1970s, emphasized the Wicksellian tradition at the former 
(by Björn Thalberg, a student of Frisch, Haavelmo, Eric Lundberg and Bent Hansen) and the tradition 
of Keynes
3 at the latter (by Nicky Kaldor, Richard Goodwin, Joan Robinson, Mario Nuti and Luigi 
Pasinetti, students, friends and contemporaries of Keynes, Sraffa, Kalecki, Schumpeter and Harrod). 
These  traditions  have  left  indelible  marks  in  the  way  I  have  approached the  teaching  of  regular 
courses in macroeconomics, at both undergraduate and various postgraduate levels at Universities in 
Asia, Europe, Latin America and the US
4. 
                                                           
1 The full context of this quote is clearly set out in Richard Kahn’s elegant Raffaele Mattioli Lectures (Kahn, 
1984, pp. 179-180), delivered in the year of the Keynes Birth Centennial (1983). The formal 
institutionalization of The Marshall Lectureship was only achieved the year after Hayek’s talk at the Marshall 
Society, with – I believe – the first of the Marshall Lectures eventually given by Jacob Viner in the academic 
year 1946-7. 
2 In 1971 the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics was awarded to Simon Kuznets who was one of the earliest 
critics of Equilibrium Non-Endogenous Business Cycle Theory and an acknowledged pioneer of national 
income accounting and the fruitful role descriptive statistics can play in applied economics. Forty years later, the 
Prize was shared by two who are the antithesis of what I may call the Kuznets philosophy, methodology and 
epistemology. Forty years ago next year, the same prize was awarded to Wassily Leontief. Who else but Lance 
Taylor could be considered a ‘modern’ Leontief (& Stone)? 
3 Not, I must emphasise, the Keynesians. 
4 Over the past forty years I have taught Macroeconomics at the University of Lund, Cambridge University, the 
European University Institute, Aalborg University, the People’s University in Beijing, UCLA, the Central  
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In  addition  to  these  formal  modes  of  learning  macroeconomics,  there  were  also  the  unspoken, 
informal,  traditions  I  learned  from  long,  deep  and  fruitful  friendships  with  John  Hicks,  Geoff 
Harcourt, Bob Clower, Richard Day, John McCall and Lance Taylor, all of which left deep and 
powerful  ways  of  viewing  and  tackling  the  classic  macroeconomic  pathologies  and  interpreting 
orthodoxies critically. 
 
Professor  Visakh  Varma  has  raised  issues  in  the  choice  of  curricula  for  the  teaching  of 
macroeconomics, presumably at the postgraduate level, admittedly in an Indian context, that have 
preoccupied my own approach to effective pedagogy of a subject famous for being a servant of events 
than a master of them, except occasionally. In this note, my thoughts on the issues he has perceptively 
raised, are outlined. 
 
The paper is structured as follows: in the next section a succinct summary of the ‘vision’ – in a special 
Schumpeterian sense – with which I set out in my macroeconomic journeys is outlined; in section 3 
the  orthodox  approaches  are  outlined;  section  4  contains  notes  on  four  alternative  visions  of 
macroeconomics, each an alternative challenge to one or another aspect of orthodoxy. Finally, I try to 
extract the lessons I have learned from adhering to the alternative visions, but without adopting them 
uncritically. 
 
Macro  was  never  taught  as  if  all  issues  have  been  resolved  –  both  conceptually  and  theoretical 
technologically;  always  scope  for  new  macroeconomic  pathologies;  always  ‘armed’  with  tools, 
concepts  and  a  framework  with  which  to  work,  adapt  and  adjust  –  especially  with  the  way 
intersectoral  international  balances  are  arrayed;  balance  sheets  are  made  to  evolve  as  financial 
transactions take new forms; to learn the basic repertoire of a useful mathematical formalism, so that 
new techniques can be learned and adapted. 
 
§ 2. Macroeconomic Visions 
“In practice we all start our own research from the work of our predecessors, that is, we hardly ever 
start from scratch. …. Obviously, in order to be able to posit to ourselves any problem at all, we should 
first have to visualize a distinct set of coherent phenomena as a worth-while object of our analytic 
efforts. In other  words, analytic effort is of  necessity preceded by a preanalytic cognitive act that 
supplies the raw material for the analytic effort. In this book, this preanalytic cognitive act will be 
called Vision. It is interesting to note that vision of this kind not only must precede historically the 
emergence of analytic effort in any field but also may re-enter the history of every established science 
each time somebody teaches us to see things in a light of which the source is not to be found in the 
facts, methods, and results of the pre-existing state of the science. ” 
Joseph Schumpeter, 1954, p. 41; bold emphasis added. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
European University, Queen’s University of Belfast, the Universidad de las Americas Puebla, the Madras 
School of Economics, the National University of Ireland, Galway and the University of Trento.   
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My learning, research and teaching on macroeconomics, starting from my predecessors, in the above 
Schumpeterian senses, taught me to see the macroeconomic pathologies of monetary maladjustments, 
aggregate fluctuations, policy conundrums, trade imbalances and growth in terms of challenging, 
consistently  and  systematically,  the  assumption  of  Say’s  Law  of  Markets  (both  national  and 
international),  the  efficient  market  hypothesis,  efficiency  of  equilibria,  the  underpinning  of 
macroeconomic policy in the two fundamental theorems of welfare economics, the assumption of 
Olympian rationality (Simon, 1983, p. 19) for individuals behaving as expected utility maximizers, 
the irrelevance of equilibrium theorizing, especially in macrodynamics, and the relentless extolling of 
the virtues of the mathematization of economics, as a virtue in itself.  
 
Simultaneously,  we  were  taught  to  emphasise  the  notions  of  effective  demand  and  involuntary 
unemployment in the context of the fallacy of composition, via the Banana Parable (Keynes, 1930, p. 
178), the Widow’s Cruse to highlight the significance of functional distribution and its interaction 
with growth, so-called fundamental uncertainty (but not necessarily in formal probabilistic terms
5), 
the tradition of Political Arithmetic on which to base and understand the social and national accounts 
as a basis for the discussion of monetary imbalances (both national and international), the philosophy 
and methodology of what Joan Robinson, in her Inaugural Lecture (Robinson, 1966) called The New 
Mercantilism, essentially a sustained critique of the theory of comparative advantage,  the crucial 
significance of the stock-flow divide
6, especially in monetary macroeconomic dynamics, and, thus, to 
the controversies over liquidity preference vs. loanable funds in determining the level of the money 
rate of interest and the pervasive non -neutrality of money and the follies of the quantity theory of 
money. To these were, of course, added the distinctive Goodwinian themes of endogenous, nonlinear, 
evolutionary, dynamic vision of the growth cycle dynamics of macroeconomic fluctuations, both real 
and  monetary,  Joan  Robinson’s  sustained  critical  vision  of  capital  theory
7  and  the  characteristic 
                                                           
5 None of my Cambridge teachers either formalized any of their macrodynamics in terms of any kind of 
probabilistic underpinning, nor even remotely envisaged the usefulness of the expected utility maximization 
framework for the Olympian rationality of the individual agent to be made a part of monetary macroeconomic 
dynamics. The lesson I learned was that either nonlinearity or incompleteness – not uncertainty – or some 
judicious combination of the two, in parsimonious models was more than sufficient to understand, represent and 
remedy macroeconomic pathologies. Ditto for econometrics, of the traditional variety, and, instead, a great deal 
of emphasis was made on the necessity, desirability and feasibility of numerical simulations to understand, 
iterate between theoretical specifications – even of the balance sheet and national accounts variety – and 
prediction for policy purposes. 
6 Kalecki’s characteristically succinct, yet pungent view on this was reported by Joan Robinson (Robinson, 1982 
in her mercilessly critical review of Leijonhufvud (1981): 
“When Michal Kalecki was in London,  soon after the publication of Keynes’ General Theory, Richard Kahn and I 
had a date to meet him at a restaurant. We arrived first, and as Michal came over to the table where we were sitting 
he announced ‘I have found out what economics is; it is the science of confusing stocks with flows’. It is this 
confusion that has kept the Quantity Theory of Money alive until today. … 
Professor Leijonhufvud has never understood Kalecki’s point so that his monetary theory is both confused and 
confusing.” 
7 Professor Varma’s insightful remarks on Gautam Mathur’s efforts at Osmania University (op.cit, p. 24), at 
introducing Cambridge Macrodynamics and its integration with the sectoral analysis of Sraffa, Leontief and von  
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Kaldorian emphasis on increasing returns to scale, coupled to the old Smithian themes of ‘the division 
of labour and the extent of the market’. 
 
There were only a handful of macroeconomic classics we were encouraged – even admonished – to 
read  and  become  familiar  with:  Wicksell’s  Interest  and  Prices  &  Vol.  I  of  his  Lectures, 
Schumpeter’s Theory of Economic Development, Robertson’s Banking Policy and the Price Level, 
the Treatise on Money (volumes I & II) by Keynes, Monetary Equilibrium by Myrdal, The General 
Theory by Keynes, Studies in the Theory of Economic Expansion by Lundberg, Kalecki’s Studies in 
the Theory of Business Cycles, Studies in the Theory of Expansion by Lundberg and Lindahl’s 
Studies in the Theory of Money and Capital
8. Neither Fisher, nor Hayek, were even mentioned, even 
non-felicitously, especially not in macroeconomic contexts, and ditto for Value and Capital by Hicks. 
 
That  these  modern  macroeconomic  classics  stood  on  the  mighty  shoulders  of  the  works  of  the 
Classical Economists was never forgotten; nor did Marx, Hilferding and Rosa Luxembourg go 
unmentioned, felicitously
9. Lectures by Dobb, Goodwin, Kaldor, Nuti, Pasinetti and Joan Robinson, 
invoked the names of the classical economists, and Keynes, as if they were intimate friends  – and we 
were expected to understand the contexts, without further ado! 
 
As for the theoretical technology
10 (Lucas, 1981, p. 9) of monetary macrodynamics, at least as far as I 
was concerned, my main teachers were Björn Thalberg at Lund and Richard Goodwin at Cambridge, 
and both emphasized nonlinear dynamics, the particular vision of optimal aggregate growth, coupled 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
Neumann reminds me that both Planning for Steady Growth by Mathur (1965) and Sukhamoy Chakravarty’s 
Capital and Development Planning (Chakravarty, 1969), as well as works by K.N. Raj, were frequently 
referred to by Joan Robinson, Maurice Dobb and Richard Goodwin, in the Cambridge of the early 1970s. In 
particular in connection with capital and (optimal) growth theory, in relation to planning for development. 
During my brief visit to JNU a couple of years ago, Professor Prabhat Patnaik’s recollection of a typically 
pungent observation by Gautam Mathur should be mentioned here. During his sojourn at Nuffield College in 
Oxford, in the early 196os, at the height of the Cambridge Controversies in Capital Theory, Mathur, observing 
some of the Oxford neoclassical stalwarts and their inflexible ‘High Table’ manners, remarked: ‘These 
neoclassicals are cavalier about the malleability of capital but refuse to countenance the enjoyment of a fine 
meat dish with fish knives.’ 
8 When Kaldor interviewed me, in May, 1973, just before admitting me as a PhD student at King’s College, 
Cambridge,  indeed, to be supervised by him, the only question he asked me was: ‘Why do you want to come 
here when you have Lindahl in Sweden’! I could not, of course, remind him that Lindahl had died in 1960. I 
came to Cambridge, having completed a Master’s degree in Political Economy at the University of Lund (my 
M.Sc thesis was supervised by Professor Björn Thalberg).  
9 When Richard Goodwin agreed to take me on as his student and when I told him about my interests in capital 
theory and endogenous cycle theory, his main response was: ‘Any economics student who wants to work 
seriously on these theories must read Marx and Böhm-Bawerk’. 
10 Meaning by this phrase, essentially, mathematical and numerical techniques, to serve the needs of the 
economic theorist as a modeler, to tell his or her story in one of many persuasive ways and to illustrate the 
subtle nature of reason’s limits in drawing conclusions, especially, on the policy front. That economics was not 
applied mathematics, even if it was not made too clear whether it was a moral science, belonged to the 
humanities or exclusively a social science, was always a backdrop to whatever was the focus of discussion at 
any one point in time.  
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to an ethical grounding of policy, coming down the Ramsey line – but not in the way orthodoxy has 
appropriated it - and the importance of transaction matrices and the balance sheets. The latter was, for 
Thalberg, the Oslo tradition of Ragnar Frisch and Leif Johansen; for Goodwin, it was the Leontief-
Stone tradition, not unrelated to the way Stone re-interpreted and generalized The Multiplier as Matrix 
(Goodwin, 1949) to integrate the national income accounting implicit in How to Pay for the War 
(Keynes, 1940) and the intersectoral accounting of Sraffa and Leontief, which led to the remarkably 
fertile work of Pyatt and Roe (1977)
11. 
 
The orthodox triptych of equilibrium, rationality and optimization was syste matically challenged by 
focusing on evolutionary disequilibria, varieties of bounded rationality and satisficing – although the 
‘pretty, polite, techniques’ that mathematized the former was, we were cautioned, not easily available 
for  the  formalization  of  the  latter  triptych.  The  subtle  message  here  was  that  the  bright  and the 
audacious could explore new pathways of unorthodox research in challenging orthodoxy in building 
foundations for macrodynamics on this alternative triptych. We, as students, were encouraged to learn 
from Shackle and Simon, Nelson and Winter, Nikaido and (Jacob) Schwartz
12 and, of course, Sraffa 
and von Neumann. Taming the unruly dynamics of stock-flow interactions by means of disciplined 
accounting, studying the disequilibrium dynamics  of aggregate fluctuations in employment and 
output, understanding the mechanisms that underpinned functional distribution of income, managing 
the monetary dynamics of production economies and, above all, making sure that the tools and 
concepts that were de vised  –  that  were  constantly  in  need  of  renewal  –  served  the  needs  of 
compassionate visions that did not exclusively focus on the apologetics of equity-efficiency tradeoffs. 
 
On reflection now, forty years later, it seems to me that the implicit emphasis on the theoretical 
technology of learning from simulation and, therefore, modeling monetary-production macrodynamic 
systems – whether aggregative, as in Robinson, Kaldor and Goodwin, or disaggregative, as in Sraffa, 
Stone and Godley – in ways that made it possible to do so, was a hallmark of the epistemology of 
Cambridge macroeconomics. Orthodoxy caught up with this epistemology, by fits and starts, via the 
move from Arrow-Debreu General Equilibrium (ADGE) to Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) 
and  Applied  Computable  General  Equilibrium  (ADGE)  to  its  –  hopefully  –  final  graveyard  in 
                                                           
11 One day, in early 1976, Richard Goodwin told me that Richard Stone had called him and asked him, bluntly: 
‘Whatever happened to the Multiplier as Matrix?’. The reason was that Stone was preparing the Foreword to the 
work by Pyatt and Roe on constructing Social Accounting Matrices for planning development in Sri Lanka, and 
wanted to link this work with his classic work with Champernowne and Meade (Stone, et. al., 1942), when they 
were constructing national income accounting schemes to implement Keynes’ suggestion in How to Pay for the 
War. This is the Political Arithmetic of Petty (Stone, 1980), coming down from Keynes and the Swedish and 
Oslo tradition of national income and balance sheet tradition of Lindahl, Frisch and Leif Johansen, now nobly 
being developed by Lance Taylor (see also Hicks, 1956). 
12 I can recall with much vividness that the leading bookshop in Cambridge in the early 1970s regularly stocked 
the two volumes of Lectures on the Analytical Method in Economics by Jacob Schwartz.  
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Stochastic  Dynamic  General  Equilibrium  (SDGE),  mediated  by  the  Real  Business  Cycle  (RBC) 
claims of generalizing ADGE with Recursive Competitive Equilibrium (RCE) to dynamise the static 
CGE.  This  is  a  path  towards  infusing  orthodox  macroeconomics  with  an  epistemology  of 
computation, but without sacrificing the altar of equilibrium. The virtue of Cambridge and Oslo was 
to have been there, at the beginning, without any obeisance to any kind of equilibrium, but respecting 
the balances of the intrinsic dynamics of accounting.  
 
Cambridge,  on  the  other  hand,  did  not  ever  abandon  the  Marshallian  heritage  of  reasoning  and 
persuading with geometry – curve-sketching, even in Macroeconomics – of which Joan Robinson
13 
and Richard Goodwin
14 were supreme exponents (Kaldor less so), as much as Keynes, Robertson, 
Sraffa and Dobb were ma sters of exquisite prose.  Pedagogy vied equally with analysis  – Pigou’s 
‘tool-makers’ and ‘tool-users’  – made famous in the credo popularized by Joan Robinson in the 
opening sentences of her classic on Imperfect Competition (ibid, p.1): 
“This book is presented to the analytical economist as a box of tools. It is an essay in the technique of 
economic analysis, and can make only an indirect contribution to our knowledge of the actual world. It 
is only by using their tools upon observed facts that economists can build up that working model of the 
actual world which it is their aim to construct. To tinker with the tool-box is merely a preliminary to the 
main attack ….. . The gap between the tool-makers and the tool-users is a distressingly wide one, and 
no economists can fail to have sympathy with the impatience of the politician, the business man, and 
the statistical investigator, who complain of the extremely poor,, arid, or even misleading information 
with which the analytical economists provide him.” 
 
That the tools must be fashioned to serve the purposes of the problems to be solved was the message; 
not  that  the  problems  must  be  adapted  for  the  use  of  the  tools,  as  it  has  become  in  orthodoxy, 
particularly in its newclassical variants (see the next section). Stigler’s critical observation, in his 
perceptive review of Samuelson’s Foundations (Stigler, 1948, p. 605; italics added), was an implicit 
warning to us, as students, and was highlighted in the Cambridge pedagogy that I experienced: 
“Some of the infinities of mathematical possibilities are discussed, but only in the most formal terms; 
there  is  no  instance  of  the  enlargement  of  our  knowledge  of  economic  processes  in  our  society. 
Samuelson may reply that he is only providing tools, but who can know what tools we need unless he 
knows the material on which they will be used.”  
 
Thus, I left my formal education period in macroeconomics with a vision of the importance, even the 
superiority of, the theoretical technologies of curve-sketching and numerical simulation to study the 
consistency of monetary accounts – quite apart from learning the importance of the mathematics of 
                                                           
13 There are 83 diagrams in The Economics of Imperfect Competition (Robinson, 1933), and less than half 
that number in that classic of persuasion by geometry, the Principles by Marshall (1924)! Contrariwise, as 
Alice may have said, there is not a single diagram in the main text of The Accumulation of Capital (Robinson, 
1956); they are ‘relegated’ to a special section, after the main text, titled Diagrams (of which there are only 19 
in the 3
rd edition of a book that is over 450 pages in length! 
14 There are 66 diagrams in Elementary Economics from the Higher Standpoint (Goodwin, 1970), in a book 
of only 199 pages; Robinson (op.cit) is 348 pages long and Marshall’s Principles (8
th edition) is a staggering 
858 pages in length! The ratio of geometry (and mathematics, but it was the geometry of nonlinear dynamics) to 




nonlinear dynamical systems. Much of the era of newclassical macroeconomics has been dominated 
by diametrically opposed theoretical technologies, but – strangely – it is orthodoxy that is trying to 
catch up with what Cambridge was practicing, and preaching, at least epistemologically, throughout 
the era dominated by Keynes and his immediate followers.  
 
§ 3. Evolution of Varieties of Orthodoxy 
 [T]he meaning of the word macroeconomics has changed to refer to the tools being used rather than just to 
the study of business cycle fluctuations.  
Edward C. Prescott (2004), p. 371; italics added. 
 
If to this remarkably jaundiced view of what macroeconomics is supposed to have become 
one adds the convictions of another of the stalwarts of newclassical macroeconomics
15, then 
one may be forgiven for thinking that the old distinction Pigou made famous between ‘tool-
makers’ and tool-users’ has been obliterated: 
 “[A]s economic analysts we are directed by, if not prisoners of, the mathematical tools we possess." 
Sargent (1987, p. xix; italics added. 
 
The unspoken message seems to be that the ‘tool-users’ – Joan Robinson’s economic analyst – are 
interchangeable with the ‘tool-makers’. Central bankers and finance ministers – even Prime Ministers, 
witness the examples of India and Italy, to take two obvious current examples - are, therefore, trained 
in ‘tool-making’, first, and become ‘tool-users’ in their incarnation as applied economic analysts. No 
wonder, then, that policy making reflects – contrary to those celebrated final words by Keynes in the 
GT
16 – ‘the newest ideas’ emerging from both fresh-water and salt-water departments of economics 
(Hall, 1976, p.1). 
 
Robert Gordon (1989;2004), however, felt able to pronounce
17, if not an obituary for newclassical 
economics, at least a  decline  of  ‘the  original  Lucas  version  of  new-classical  macroeconomics’ 
characterized  by  continuous  market  clearing  (Say’s  Law),  rational  expectations  and  imperfect 
                                                           
15 Indeed the most recent Economics Nobel Laureate, whose early opinion quoted above, is echoed in the 
philosophy, methodology and epistemology enunciated by the founding father of newclassical macroeconomics, 
Lucas (1980; 1981), in his even less enlightened Methodology of Business Cycles and, of course, codified by 
Prescott’s above summarizing statement on ‘the meaning of the word Macroeconomics’, in his Nobel Prize 
Lecture, given on December, 8, 2004. 
16 Most economists of my generation, or earlier, would have committed to memory that famous Keynesian 
reflection (GT, p. 384): “.. the ideas which civil servants and politicians and even agitators apply to current 
events are not likely to be the newest.”  
17 Indeed, even the zenith point of newclassical economics’ ‘short-lived period of peak influence’, is dated with 
admirable precision (ibid, p. 228, footnote 2): ‘The high-water mark can be placed fairly precisely at 8.50 A.M. 
EDT on Friday, October 13 1978, at Bald Peak, New Hampshire, just before Robert Barro and Mark Rush 
began their presentation of an empirical test of the policy-ineffectiveness proposition … .’ Alas, these obituaries 
have not reached the ears of those in Stockholm who determine the winners of the annual Nobel memorial 
award to economists – or, perhaps, it is a time-lag that is at work? Sargent and Sims must read their ‘obituaries’ 
with some amusement!  
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information  –  thus  obliterating  the  distinction  between  risk  and  uncertainty  that  once  united 
Cambridge (Keynes) and Chicago (Knight). All he needed to add to this new triumvirate was the 
fourth feature of intertemporal optimization to completely characterize the SDGE finessing of the 
original neoclassical closure: preferences, endowments and technology which, in turn, is manifested 
in the classic triptych of rationality, equilibrium and optimality (or efficiency). 
 
In the pre-dawn, halcyon period of a homogeneous macroeconomic orthodoxy, just about the time I 
began attending graduate classes in the subject, there was almost no controversy in the choice of 
Samuelson’s Foundations and Patinkin’s Money, Interest and Prices (Patinkin, 1965) as the core 
textbooks. The former provided the tools that were harnessed by the latter to make the neoclassical 
synthesis pedagogically transmittable to generations of graduate students. True, Clower’s rumblings, 
challenging the implicit claims of a consistency between Walrasian microeconomics and Keynesian 
macroeconomics was becoming an increasing irritant.  
 
However,  the  full  force  of  orthodoxy’s  belief  in  intertemporally  optimal,  continuously  cleared 
markets,  peopled  by  imperfectly  informed,  yet  rationally  expecting  agents,  populated  in  islands, 
providing microeconomic foundations for macroeconomic, was yet to be codified by an alternative 
macroeconomics. Some would date its conception with Friedman’s celebrated address to the AEA in 
1967; others, like me, prefer to date it, not from conception, but from actual birth: forty years ago with 
Expectations and the Neutrality of Money (Lucas, 1972). Monetary neutrality, hence the quantity 
theory of money, the endogenising of labour supply, bringing with it the theoretical technology of 
recursive  macroeconomics  –  Markov  Decision  Processes,  Dynamic  Programming  and  Kalman 
Filtering  –  and  the  enhancing  of  a  dubious  aggregate  production  function  with  the  additional 
argument of human capital, Lucas set in motion, in one fell swoop, a fully-fledged macroeconomic 
revolution that has matured into what at the frontiers of the subject is now referred to as the SDGE 
model. 
 
The path from the neoclassical synthesis to orthodoxy’s current theoretical and applied frontiers, with 
SDGE modeling and so-called business cycle accounting (Chari, et.al., 2002), is easy, with hindsight, 
to trace. But before such a potted history is outlined, it might be useful to record , for the benefit of 
‘posterity’, the actual genesis of the term neoclassical synthesis. In his Perugia Lectures, Clower 
(1973; italics added) recalled a conversation with Paul Samuelson: 
“Do you remember anything about the events of 1951-2 in the U.S? The Korean War, yes, but something 
else that is rather more important. McCarthy. Who was he attacking? Samuelson among others. There were 
a lot of people attacking him as a communist and a left winger and a Keynesian and so forth.  
I asked him once, after Axel Leijonhufvud’s book came out whether he had read it and he said yes, he had 
started reading it but he had thrown it down after chapter 2 because he regarded this as an unwarranted 
attack which simply indicated that it was not worth doing serious theory. I tried to convince him that there  
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was more to it than that, in fact I said “I really think you should go on and read what he has to say more 
seriously about the neo-classical synthesis” and Samuelson’s response was: “What could he say about that, 
it is just a term to describe the way in which one can think about these problems to avoid conflict with 
either the left or the right”. Of course I, like everyone else at that time, had taken it for granted for several 
years that there was some kind of analytical content in the neo-classical synthesis. “Oh, not at all”, said he, 
“don’t you remember what was happening in those years?” And I said “no”. “Well, McCarthy was after me 
and I put in the neo-classical synthesis and suggested that it was just a matter of point of view in order to 
get him off my back”.  
 
From these pseudo-scientific origins, the neoclassical synthesis, at least in its policy-oriented and 
textbook  versions,  came  to  be  complemented  –  and  ‘completed’  if  a  formal  sense  –  with  the 
incorporation of the Phillips trade-off, thus putting to rest many Patinkinian ghosts on the classical 
dichotomy. Independently, of course, another kind of ‘completion’ was achieved via the work of 
Arrow and Debreu (ADGE)
18, which is the fountainhead for the path towards SDGE, via Scarf’s 
powerful  research  program  on  CGE
19, leading to varieties of policy -oriented AGE models, even 
encompassing general equilibrium modelling of development, and finding its final (hopefully) resting 
place in the recursive competitive equilibrium of RBC theorists. With developments in endogenous 
growth theory integrated into this latter framework, underpinned by the two fundamental theorems of 




The feeble, entirely ad hoc, attempt to resurrect some semblance of a path from the neoclassical 
synthesis to what is, at the frontiers of macroecon omics, called New Keynesian economics  – 
essentially incorporating varieties of ‘stickiness’ in adjustment and market dynamics, as well as less-
than-Olympian rational behaviour by optimising agents
21 - suffered, in my opinion a just and stillborn 
                                                           
18 As Foley (2004, p. 191) perceptively observed: 
“Nobody [at MIT during Foley’s time there], curiously enough, talked to me about the Cambridge 
[capital] controversy at the time. Later, I became interested in the topic and wanted to know what 
people as MIT had been thinking. I asked Karl Shell about it, and he said, as far as he remembered, 
Solow and Samuelson viewed the Cambridge, England, position in the capital controversy as a lesser 
threat to their ambitions for neoclassical theory than the work of Gerard Debreu. I think that is 
interesting, and the more I think about it, the more I think it has a core of truth. 
19 Incidentally, Hahn’s Inaugural Lecture at Cambridge, given on 28 February 1973, titled On the Notion of 
Equilibrium in Economics (Hahn, 1973), had nothing to say about this line of development of ADGE (nor 
anything, indeed, about what was to become newclassical macroeconomics even though Prescott was a seminar 
speaker at Churchill College, Hahn’s citadel at Cambridge, in 1973), although I remember his scathing remarks 
on Brouwer’s constructivism, mentioned felicitously in Scarf (1973), during the graduate lectures by him that I 
attended in 1973/4. 
20 None of the computability or constructivity claims of CGE, AGE, RCE, RBC or SDGE are correct, as I have 
shown in a series of papers (see, Velupillai (2006, 2009). Samuelson’s (1998, p. 35; italics in the original) wise 
remark on this kind of calisthenics is worth recalling: 
“"The phoenix of real business cycles has been whistled up anew. But it has not come from the ashes 
of a wrongly discarded real business cycle methodology. That, like herpes, has always been with us. 
What is new, and a little foolish, is the concept of a Pareto-optimal real business cycle." 
21 Leading, in its turn, to the kind of Behavioural Macroeconomics with a New Keynesian slant, most closely 
associated with the work of Akerlof (see Akerlof, 2001 & Akerlof and Shiller, 2009). Mario Nuti’s elegant  
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death, in one of its incarnations, as The New Neoclassical Synthesis and the Role of Monetary Policy 
(Goodfriend & King, 1997). 
 
But, of course, it arose, like a hydra-head, in another incarnation, as Woodford’s Interest & Prices
22, 
whereby, we were now told that the long-run world was newclassical, but there was room for living 
and  working  in  the  short-run  with  ‘Keynesian’  features,  contemptuously  dismissed  by  hard-core 
Lucasians who, of course would not countenance any ground to Keynes, bastardised or not. 
 
Two kinds of codification of orthodox macroeconomics have to be remembered by those of us who, 
holding alternative visions, have to teach the subject. I shall, for simplicity, refer to them as the New 
Keynesian and the SDGE credos – the former culled out of John Taylor (2000) and the latter from 
Romer (1989). The SDGE credo for macroeconomic modelling, codified by Romer, amounts to the 
following: 
1.  Growth is a general equilibrium process; a growth theorist must construct a dynamic general 
equilibrium model underpinned by explicit specifications of preferences, technology and an 
equilibrium concept. 
2.   The mathematical tool to be used in the characterization of dynamic competitive equilibrium 
models should be  the Kuhn-Tucker theorem since it offers a  procedure for reducing the 
problem of calculating competitive equilibria to that of solving a maximization problem
23.  
3.  Of all the policy questions concerning growth, the most fundamental is whether there are any 
policies that an omniscient, omnipotent, benevolent social planner could implement to raise 
the welfare of all individuals in an economy; i.e., in formal terms, the question is whether or 
not equilibria are Pareto optimal. 
4.  To treat this question seriously, economists must generate a set of models with Pareto optimal 
& Pareto suboptimal equilibria, such that policy questions w.r.t growth facts can be reduced 
to a choice from such a set. 
5.  Given  the  equivalence  between  saddle  points  and  competitive  equilibria,  the  economic 
theoretical implications of the Kuhn-Tucker theorem are: 
i.  The sufficient conditions of the theorem embody the First Fundamental Theorem of 
Welfare Economics: i.e., competitive equilibria are Pareto optimal  
                                                                                                                                                                                      
critique of this line of research is something to which I subscribe wholeheartedly, as is evident from my own 
series of published works on this topic (Nuti, 2009, Velupillai, 2010). 
22 Although third rate macroeconomists, several in my own immediate academic environment, feel they can 
aspire to a higher status by choosing to title their pathetic papers by paraphrasing the great macroeconomists – 
paraphrasing, for example, The Economic Consequences of this or that – it was most surprising for me, anyway, 
to find that a serious scholar like Woodford using the title from Wicksell’s classic! Mercifully, the subtitles are 
quite different. Wicksell’s is a characteristically humble, A Study of the Causes Regulating the Value of Money; 
Woodford’s the more ambitious, Foundations of a Theory of Monetary Policy. 
23 These claims are formally and demonstrably false.  
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ii.  The necessary conditions of the theorem imply the Second Fundamental Theorem of 
Welfare Economics: i.e., for any Pareto Optimally determined quantities, there exists 
a price system that decentralizes these quantities as a competitive equilibrium  
The John Taylor credo (Taylor, 2000), which codifies the underpinnings of the contents of a standard, 
very  successful,  highly  pedagogical,  graduate  text  such  as  David  Romer’s  Advanced 
Macroeconomics (Romer, 2006), is as follows. In teaching macro, and – I presume – practicing it as 
a policy-oriented economist, ‘it is useful to emphasize five key components of macroeconomics’ 
(ibid, p. 90): 
“First, the long-run real GDP trend, or potential GDP, can be understood using the growth model 
developed  by  Robert  Solow  and  that  has  now  been  extended  to  make  ‘technology’  explicitly 
endogenous.  Second,  there  is  no  long-run  trade-off  between  inflation  and  unemployment,  so  that 
monetary policy affects inflation but is otherwise neutral with respect to real variables in the long run. 
Third, there is a short-run trade-off between inflation and unemployment with significant implications 
for economic fluctuations around the trend of potential GDP; the trade-off is due largely to temporarily 
sticky prices and wages. Fourth, expectations of inflation and of future policy decisions are endogenous 
and quantitatively significant. Fifth, monetary-policy decisions are best thought of as rules, or reaction 
functions, in which the short-term nominal interest rate (the instrument of policy) is adjusted in reaction 
to economic events.” 
 
To  this  must  be  added  that  ‘Ponzi  schemes’  are  ruled  out  by  decree  (Romer,  2006,  p.  52)  and, 
therefore, macroeconomic pathologies, like the ones under which we are now living, are impossible to 
encapsulate in any form – for understanding or even prediction purposes
24.  
Nothing in either of these credos about effective  demand or increasing returns to scale (except the 
sleight of hand with which something that is supposed to be an element of increasing returns to scale 
is incorporated in endogenous growth models); nothing, of course, of the fallacy of composition nor 
of the Widow’s Cruse; not the slightest hint of endogenous, nonlinear, dynamics and the intrinsic non-
separability  of  growth  and  cycles;  the  quantity  theory  and  monetary  neutrality  rules;  growth,  by 
decree, is optimal and efficient; policy is legal only in terms of the fundamental theorems of welfare 
economics, and thereby, officially underpinned by pseudo-rigorous microeconomics. Obviously, in 
the long-run – I am, of course, tempted to invoke Keynes – Say’s Law also rules. And so on. 
 
Intertemporally efficient, rationally expected equilibria, are the rule; even if, from time to time, the 
representative agent is replaced by an overlapping generations model, with which some of the many 
possibilities  for  discretionary  policy  when  endogenous  nonlinearity  underpins  the  intertemporal 
structure of the dynamic interaction between different generations of coexisting, rational agents.  
 
                                                           
24 No more elegant description of this kind of somnambulant approach to macroeconomic modeling than 
Keynes’ acid reflection is necessary (Keynes, 1937; 1973, p. 114): 
“All these pretty, polite, techniques, made for a well-panelled board room and a nicely regulated 
market, are liable to collapse [when ‘the forces of disillusion … suddenly impose a new conventional 
basis of valuation]”.   
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And so, what kind of textbook adventures could I offer my graduate students? What are the current 
substitutes for what was, in my time as a graduate student, the staples: the Foundations by Samuelson 
and Money, Interest, and Prices by Patinkin (1965) – neither of which taught me optimal stochastic control 
theory, Markov decision processes, Kalman – or any other – filtering theory, not even dynamic programming? 
The former is now replaced by Recursive Methods in Economic Dynamics (Stokey & Lucas, 1994); 
the latter by Interest and Prices (Woodford, 2000), supplemented by Romer (2006). Although this 
has been the staple diet, for that part of my macroeconomic course which tries to familiarize the 
students  with  the  core  contents  of  orthodoxy,  Sargent’s  series  of  three  advanced  textbooks  on 
macroeconomics  –  Macroeconomic  Theory  (Sargent,  1978;  1987),  Dynamic  Macroeconomic 
Theory (1987) and Recursive Macroeconomic Theory (Ljungqvist & Sargent, 2000; 2004) – are 
also  utilized,  partly  to  tell  the  student  of  the  story  of  the  development  of  newclassical 
macroeconomics, on their own terms
25. 
 
What this means, for someone like me with radically alternative visions and commanding entirely 
different theoretical technologies, is that I have to retool myself constantly, even while pursuing my 
own agenda in tool-making
26, in mathematical methods that I know are irrelevant for economics, 
especially since every frontier mathematical framework is seriously deficient in numerical meaning – 
for computing, simulating and for any other algorithmic purpose. 
 
§ 4. Four Alternative Macroeconomic Traditions 
“Yet if the only form of tradition, of handing down, consisted in following the ways of the immediate 
generation before us in a blind or timid adherence to its successes, “tradition” should positively be 
discouraged. We have seen many such simple currents soon lost in the sand; …. Tradition is a matter of 
much wider significance. It cannot be inherited, and if you want it you must obtain it by great labour. It 
involves, in the first place, the historical sense …. .” 
 
From: Tradition and the Individual Talent by T.S. Eliot 
 
I began an essay on Alternative Macroeconomics, more than two years ago, as a summary of the 
visions provided by five recent – and not-so-recent – monographs
27 on non-traditional approach to 
                                                           
25 Lest the unsuspecting reader thinks I am trying to give the impression that I was teaching superhuman 
students, who were able to read, with complete mastery of the theoretical technologies that these texts 
demanded, then let me assure them that this was – and is – not so. The idea has always been to recommend one 
or some of them as sub-core textbooks, selected chapters on which I lecture, contextually, and always against 
the background of the non-traditional content in one of the main texts (usually Taylor, 2004 and, now, also 
Taylor 2010: in earlier years also Flaschel, et. al., 1997) and Chiarella & Flaschel, 2000). 
26 In my case computability theory, constructive analysis and the nonlinear dynamics part of dynamical systems 
theory, from the strictly technical part, leaving aside epistemological and philosophical studies to make sense of 
these theoretical technologies in economic contexts.  





28, in my attempt at extracting a unified theme from these five approaches – all 
with  common  themes,  but  each  emphasising  different,  important,  aspects  neglected  by  the  twin-
orthodoxies of current dominancy. My Alternative Macroeconomics was subtitled: Rekindling Keynes 
(Taylor,  2004,  2010)  &  Skidelsky,  2009),  Revising  Hayek  (Frydman  &  Goldberg,  2007,  2011), 
Reinterpreting Marx  (Patnaik, 2008) & Rejuvenating Wicksell (in parts, Godley & Lavoie, 2007). 
When I was nearing completion of a first draft of that essay, Lance Taylor’s supremely attractive, 
interestingly provocative, thoroughly enjoyable Maynard’s Revenge (Taylor, 2010) appeared on the 
‘scene’, together with Frydman & Goldberg’s (2011) elegant Beyond Mechanical Markets. The 
former is a less technical than Reconstructing Macroeconomics, but more copiously endowed with 
institutional  and  doctrine-historical  context;  the  latter,  equally,  a  less  demanding,  updating,  of 
Imperfect Knowledge Economics. 
 
Whereas in my previous graduate course in macroeconomics, given last year,  I had used Taylor 
(2004) and Frydman & Goldberg (2007) as the core textbooks, supplemented by selected chapters of 
Romer (2006) and Ljungqvist & Sargent (2000;2004), this time (a course just completed), I decided to 
combine Maynard’s Revenge and Beyond Mechanical Markets, with Romer (2006) and Sargent 
(1987) – the latter chosen explicitly to contrast its handling of ‘Monetary Economics and Government 
Finance’  with  the  much  more  historically,  institutionally  and  doctrine-historically  enlightened 
approach in Taylor’s recent book.  
 
All of the non-traditional texts mentioned above emphasise, in varying degrees, all those aspects of an 
interesting monetary macroeconomic theory that does not rule the possible emergence of aggregate 
pathologies: of inflation, unemployment, policy conundrums, the fallacy of composition, Widow’s 
cruse issues of functional income distribution coupled to the dynamics of class conflict, social and 
national  accounting  highlighting  intrinsic  stock-flow  dynamics,  endogenously  fluctuating  growth 
dynamics modeled with the theoretical technology of nonlinear mathematics, occasionally also the 
interactions between social and national accounting consistency and aggregate endogenous dynamics, 
the irrelevance of Say’s Law and its financial market handmaiden – the efficient market hypothesis, 
the  mendacity  of  assuming  universal  individual  rationality  and  rational  expectations,  the  role  of 
imperfect knowledge and fundamental uncertainty, the importance of increasing returns to scale, the 
crucial role of effective demand, also in its incarnation as Marx’s realization problem, asset price 
bubbles understood from several different perspectives, and much else.  
 
                                                           
28 By ‘non-traditional’ I mean, of course – and also meant by the authors of the five excellent books mentioned 
above – neither the dominant Newclassical nor the limping New Keynesian approaches to ‘macroeconomic 
theory’.   
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But none of these interesting, enlightened, challenging and anti-orthodox texts, potentially – and in 
actual fact, at least in my hands - core textbooks in graduate monetary macroeconomic courses, can be 
considered  Wicksellian,  in  the  sense  in  which  Lindahl,  Myrdal,  Hammarskjöld  and  Lundberg, 
extended and generalized Interest and Prices in the direction of monetary disequilibrium dynamics. 
Although Wicksell took as his starting point, for his macroeconomic monetary analysis, a stationary 
(equilibrium), from which the famous cumulative processes emerged, the Wicksellians started from 
the fact that ‘the very existence of a monetary mechanism implies dynamic conditions’ and, therefore, 
‘the best method’ [to understand and explain] the dynamics of a monetary production economy was 
‘to take a state of disequilibrium as a starting point of [their] analysis’ (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1936; see 
also  Timlin,  1942).  The  Wicksellians  were  uncompromising  in  juxtaposing  dynamics  with 
disequilibrium in monetary production economies; but above all, they did not restrict the dynamics to 
be that which was tamable by one or another kind of differential or difference equation
29. 
 
That  Wicksell  and  the  Wic ksellians  developed  a  monetary  theory,  developing  an  essentially 
Cambridge cash-balance theory of money to introduce a wedge between orthodoxy’s eternal division 
between just consumption and investment – whether atemporal or intertemporal – a third element, 
money-saving, is not overemphasized. Instead, the traditional division between the loanable funds-
liquidity preference theories of the determination of the rate of interest has dominated the tendency to 
highlight the non-Keynesian aspect of the Wicksellians monetary macroeconomics.  
As  Mabel  Timlin  pointed  out,  in  what  I  think  is  the  earliest  –  and  easily  the  most  clear  and 
comprehensive - monograph on Keynesian Economics (Timlin, 1942, p. 4): 
“The  consequences  of  this  innovation  in  the  theory  of  money  for  trade-cycle  theory  were  quickly 
perceived; yet so solidly established was the concept of a self-equilibrating universe, the ‘automatic’ 
repercussions of which tended toward a mathematically determined norm, that terms were borrowed 
from  the  vocabulary  of  religion  to  describe  the  attitude  of  economists  toward  this  tenet  of  their 
philosophies.  Those  who  subscribed  to  the  dogma  were  ‘orthodox’.  Any  man  who  challenged  the 
doctrine could be almost as effectively damned before his fellow economists by being called a ‘heretic’ 
as any dissenter from the dogmas of the medieval church could be.” 
 
That the Wicksellians incorporated effective demand is also clear, albeit in a convoluted way, by 
Lindahl’s reinterpretation and finessing of Wicksell’s notion of ‘all goods’ to a consideration of only 
‘consumption  goods’  made  it  possible  for  Myrdal  and  Lindahl  to  point  out  that  the  demand  for 
consumer goods – i.e., effective demand – is that part of national income that is not saved. This gave 
them a direct path to national income accounting, in which they were far advanced to Keynes and his 
Cambridge followers, who came to it after How to Pay for the War (Keynes, 1940). 
                                                           
29 Solow (1990, p. 36) noted, with characteristic perspicacity: 
“God made many more stories than differential equations, so one should not pass too easily from formal similarity 
to story-telling.” 
I have always maintained that the Wicksellians were acutely aware of this and, therefore, refused to countenance 
a straitjacketing of the dynamics of their monetary macroeconomic disequilibrium dynamic models with 
attractors of one or another type.   
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Wicksellian monetary macroeconomics was as richly characterized by the social and national income 
accounting discipline of stock-flow analysis and its intrinsic dynamics
30, the dismissal of Say’s Law 
of markets, the importance of the fallacy of composition (see Lundberg, 1996, esp. p. 31, ff & Myrdal, 
1982, p. 167
31), the significance of Widow’s Cruse distribution dynamics (Chiodi & Velupillai, 1983), 
the crucial role played by fundamental uncertainty, itself linked to ex ante–ex post analysis and, 
hence, also to stock-flow consistent modelling, justice in taxation (Wicksell, 1896 and Lindahl, 1919) 
and, hence, the role of equity in the devising of policy (Myrdal, 1934) – but also of disequilibrium, 
unstable, dynamics.   
 
Thus, I am able – for pedagogical purposes – to indulge in an immanent critique – in the sense of 
Myrdal (1939)
32 - of Taylor (2004, 2010), and thereby try to give content to a Wicksellian Monetary 
Macroeconomics almost on an equal footing with  Maynard’s Revenge. From the point of view of 
teaching, I have found the method of immanent criticism, to build a bridge between two traditions, 
most satisfyingly successful.  
 
§ 5. Visions Beyond Traditions  
“ For most of us, this is the aim 
Never here to be realised; 
Who are only undefeated 
Because we have gone on trying …” 
 
From: Dry Salvages by T.S. Eliot 
 
The  cardinal  difference  between  the  non-traditional  alternative  visions  of  macroeconomics, 
theoretically  and  from  a  policy-oriented  point  of  view,  and  the  orthodox  approach  is  the 
uncompromising  monetary  foundations  upon  which  the  former  is  built  and  the  real,  traditional 
microeconomic basis on which the latter is founded. Given this difference, particularly from Marxian, 
Wicksellian  and  Keynesian  points  of  view
33,  dynamics  and  disequilibria  are  pervasive.  The 
                                                           
30 As Hicks pointed out, in the Lindahl Festschrift (Hicks, 1956, p. 141): 
“The vital discovery which made possible the analysis of a process of change, in properly economic terms, was the 
introduction of accounting procedure. While economists were fumbling around to find a set of categories by which 
they could make a formal analysis of economic change, other people were doing the job in a professional manner. 
In all its main forms, modern economic dynamics is an accounting theory.  …[I]t is in accordance with this that 
social accounting should be its main practical instrument of application.” 
31 During personal conversations with me, in 1981, Myrdal told me how he tried to explain the ‘Banana parable’ 
to Jacob Viner, in Geneva in 1930/31, but failed miserably! 
32 Myrdal clarified the methodology he was adopting, in Monetary Equilibrium (ibid, p.v; italics added) 
“Rather than pioneer with a wholly new approach, it was quite natural for the present author to project his own 
ideas within Wicksell's old framework. Indeed this mode of presentation has been carried so far in the present 
essay that it constitutes an 'immanent criticism' of Wicksell. Although the method of immanent criticism reveals 
certain disadvantages when compared with a direct attack on the problems of monetary theory, its use is justified 
here because it makes possible the presentation of Wicksell's theory in modern dress." 
33 And it will be no incongruence of any sort in including Schumpeter in this trilogy of pioneers.  
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macroeconomy is not an underlying static or stationary entity which is bombarded, exogenously, by 
ad hoc shockeries
34 for the dynamics to emerge. 
 
In teaching, and even more importantly in research, to be confronted with a field that is ‘complete’ is 
distressing. It is hard, if not impossible, to inspire students, particularly the good and interested ones, 
to decide to choose such a subject for further exploration and, eventually, as their research field from 
which to embark on their doctoral studies. Mercifully, non-traditional macroeconomics is never a 
‘complete’ subject, from any point of view, whereas its orthodox step-cousin is often presented as 
open-ended only from the point of view of theoretical technologies.  
 
Three visions beyond the traditions are emphasized in my lectures on macroeconomics, to challenge 
the  interested  and  audacious  students  to  think  about  framing  non-traditional  monetary  issues  in 
empirically meaningful ways that have policy relevance. Having spent much time in devising, and 
explaining the construction of, accounting schemes and modeling their intrinsic dynamics – in line 
with Taylor (2004, 2010) – and indulging in a great deal of curve-drawing
35, I then go on to point out, 
first via the following perceptive observation by Maury Osborne (1977, p. 34; italics added), that 
economic and financial data are, at best, rational numbers: 
“As for the question of replacing rows of closely spaced dots by solid lines, you can do that too if you 
want to, and the governors of the exchange and the community of brokers and dealers who make 
markets will bless you. If you think in terms of solid lines while the practice is in terms of dots and little 
steps up and down, this misbelief on your part is worth, I would say conservatively, to the governors of 
the exchange, at least eighty million dollars per year." 
 
In this age of almost universal familiarity with the digital computer, especially by graduate students 
(even  those  who  may  not  be  too  advanced  in  formal  mathematical  ability  or  knowledge),  the 
implications  of  this  important  observation  by  Osborne  has  significant  consequences  for  the  way 
economic data is considered. We – as teachers – are cavalier about the structure of the data that is 
generated by any entity of the economic system, assuming that they are a realization from the real 
number field. However, no one in their right minds would assume anything but natural numbers – at 
best rational numbers – for the tables that underpin national income and product accounts or the 
balance sheets, again at any level of aggregation and any frequency of observation.  
 
                                                           
34 Richard Day’s felicitous characterization of newclassical business cycle methodology (Day, 1992). 
35 In recent months I have been trying to get to the roots of the tradition of the ‘graphical method of curves’ 
(Jenkin, 1870; 1996), made routine by Jevons and Marshall for the Anglo-Saxons (and presumably by Cournot 
for the ‘Continental Europeans’). I believe this to be as mendacious a practice as indiscriminate mathematization 
of economics. Jenkin’s reference to the ‘graphical method’ relies on the traditional graph theorem of orthodox 
real analysis and goes back to the Dirichlet-Kuratowski definition of the function concept. Such a definition 
should be replaced by the recursion theoretic graph theorem (Odifreddi, 1989, pp. 135-137) , if studies of data 
are to be pursued on the screen of a digital computer.   
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I then outline the standard graph theorem of ordinary real analysis – which is known to every student 
of economics, at least implicitly, since all of them, without exception draw the demand-supply curves 
in microeconomics, the IS-LM diagram at the elementary macroeconomics level, and so on. It is then 
easy to convince them that the digital computer, at any finite resolution, cannot represent continuous 
data – even is such were available in the economic domain – and ask them whether it is possible to 
modify the standard graph theorem so that it is applicable to the mathematics of the computer. Very 
few – if any at all, so far, in over ten years of posing this question, I have not encountered a single 
graduate student who is able to make sense of this question – are able to answer in any sensible way. 
 
A this point I present them with the recursion theoretic graph theorem, which implies that the data 
characterizing it has to be generated from some kind of recursive or recursively enumerable set, 
defining and explaining all of these terms ‘geometrically’ and intuitively. 
 
Gradually, the students are taught to study the available data – from any source – assuming they are 
being  generated  from  recursive  or  recursively  enumerable  data  sets.  The  first  step  having  being 
achieved,  the  next  step  is  to  disabuse  them  of  thinking  that  data  is  generated  by  a  probability 
mechanism. 
 
 Finally, the really difficult pedagogical problem of trying to disabuse the students of automatically 
modeling dynamics in terms of standard dynamical systems theory – at the most elementary level, in 
terms of simple differential or difference questions. Once the students, almost always without any 
exceptions, are comfortable with the trivial and realistic fact that all realized economic and financial 
data  come  as  rational  or  natural  numbers,  or  integers,  and  begin  to  become  familiar  with  the 
assumption that they have to be generated from sets of numbers that are recursive or recursively 
enumerable, if they are to be depicted on digital computers with finite precision resolution, it is easy 
to convince them that the dynamics should be generated by mapping such numbers into themselves: 
i.e., rational or natural number dynamics. 
 
This gives content to Solow’s perceptive remark that God may have made more stories than we can 
tell with differential equations! These stories by God, beyond the power of dynamical systems to 
encapsulate in any formalism, should be enriched by Paul Samuelson’s  story, in his Nobel Prize 
Lecture (Samuelson, 1970; see also Nuti, 2009), reminding those of us who think some of the stories 
that an interesting – i.e., a nonlinear – multiplier-accelerator model of aggregate fluctuations can 
encapsulate, cannot, in any formal way, be squared with a ‘maximum dynamical system’. If so, how 
can we re-tell these stories and try to learn from them? This is where the essential Wicksellian belief  
19 
 
and  practice  of  simulation  takes  on  a  life  of  its  own,  even  at  the  level  of  elementary  monetary 
macroeconomics. 
 
None  of  my  students,  in  all  my  years  of  teaching  macroeconomics,  whether  orthodox  or  non-
traditional, has ever found it difficult to accept God’s or Samuelson’s stories, and that they can tell 
more than any formalism or cannot be reconciled with maximization stories, respectively. 
 
Just before I ‘rest my case’, I remind the students of Sraffa’s deep and enduring comment, at the 
Corfu Conference on Capital Theory, reacting to Hicks on The Measurement of Capital in relation 
to the Measurement of Other Economic Aggregates (Sraffa, 1961, p. 305)
36: 
“[O]ne should emphasize the distinction between two types of measurement. First, there was the one in 
which  the  statisticians  were  mainly  interested.  Second  there  was  measurement  in  theory.  The 
statisticians’ measures were only approximate and provided a suitable field for work in solving index 
number problems. The theoretical measures required absolute precision. Any imperfections in these 
theoretical measures were not merely upsetting, but knocked down the whole theoretical basis.” 
 
The  point  here  is  that  nothing  of  the  ‘theoretical  basis’  of  any  of  the  alternative  visions  of 
macroeconomics needs to be knocked down, because all of them are compatible with the way actual 













                                                           
36 But I also remind them of an example of ignorance and arrogance by quoting from Prescott (2005, p. 523: 
italics added): 
“In the 1960s there was the famous Cambridge capital controversy. This controversy bears on the issue 
‘What is money?’ The Cambridge capital controversy was a silly one, as pointed out so clearly by 
Arrow … . Arrow being a general equilibrium theorist, pointed out that there are multiple types of 
capital goods and with multiple capital goods only under very special conditions is there an aggregate 
capital stock. I emphasize that this does not mean that a model with a single capital good, which is 
matched to the value of some capital stock statistic, is not useful in drawing scientific inference.” 
No finer example of the thorough confusion between measurement in theory and statistical measurement  is 
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Harvard — November 2, 2011 2:23 am  
An Open Letter to Greg Mankiw  
By Harvard Talks Politics  
The following letter was sent to Greg Mankiw by the organizers of today’s Economics 10 walkout. 
Wednesday November 2, 2011 
 
Dear Professor Mankiw— 
 
Today, we are walking out of your class, Economics 10, in order to express our discontent with the bias inherent 
in this introductory economics course. We are deeply concerned about the way that this bias affects students, the 
University, and our greater society. 
 
As Harvard undergraduates, we enrolled in Economics 10 hoping to gain a broad and introductory foundation of 
economic theory that would assist us in our various intellectual pursuits and diverse disciplines, which range 
from Economics, to Government, to Environmental Sciences and Public Policy, and beyond. Instead, we found 
a course that espouses a specific—and limited—view of economics that we believe perpetuates problematic and 
inefficient systems of economic inequality in our society today. 
 
A legitimate academic study of economics must include a critical discussion of both the benefits and flaws of 
different economic simplifying models. As your class does not include primary sources and rarely features 
articles from academic journals, we have very little access to alternative approaches to economics. There is no 
justification for presenting Adam Smith’s economic theories as more fundamental or basic than, for example, 
Keynesian theory. 
 
Care in presenting an unbiased perspective on economics is particularly important for an introductory course of 
700 students that nominally provides a sound foundation for further study in economics. Many Harvard students 
do not have the ability to opt out of Economics 10. This class is required for Economics and Environmental 
Science and Public Policy concentrators, while Social Studies concentrators must take an introductory 
economics course—and the only other eligible class, Professor Steven Marglin’s class Critical Perspectives on 
Economics, is only offered every other year (and not this year).  Many other students simply desire an analytic 
understanding of economics as part of a quality liberal arts education. Furthermore, Economics 10 makes it 
difficult for subsequent economics courses to teach effectively as it offers only one heavily skewed perspective 
rather than a solid grounding on which other courses can expand. Students should not be expected to avoid this 
class—or the whole discipline of economics—as a method of expressing discontent. 
 
Harvard graduates play major roles in the financial institutions and in shaping public policy around the world. If 
Harvard fails to equip its students with a broad and critical understanding of economics, their actions are likely 
to harm the global financial system. The last five years of economic turmoil have been proof enough of this. 
 
We are walking out today to join a Boston-wide march protesting the corporatization of higher education as part 
of the global Occupy movement. Since the biased nature of Economics 10 contributes to and symbolizes the 
increasing economic inequality in America, we are walking out of your class today both to protest your  
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inadequate discussion of basic economic theory and to lend our support to a movement that is changing 




Concerned students of Economics 10 
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